

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 BRASILIA 4869

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, XA, XB, XR, YO, RO, MT, UN, BR

SUBJECT: NON-ALIGNED ACTIVITIES IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

REF: A) STATE 99106 B) BRASILIA 2228

SUMMARY: AS A MEMBER OF THE GROUP OF 77, YET SHARING
MANY OF THE INTERESTS OF THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES,
BRAZIL COULD BE QUIETLY HELPFUL IN ATTEMPTS TO BRING
ABOUT MORE BROADLY BASED NEGOTIATIONS IN MULTILATERAL
FORA AND TO ALLEVIATE THE MORE STRIDENT MANIFESTATIONS
OF NACG/LDC DEMANDS. BRAZIL'S WILLINGNESS TO HELP IS,
HOWEVER, CONDITIONED BY ITS STRONG DESIRE TO RETAIN
CREDIBILITY AND INFLUENCE AMONG THE LDC'S, INCLUDING THE
NACG, ITS HEAVY DEPENDENCE ON ARAB PETROLEUM IMPORTS AND
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ITS GROWING FRUSTRATION WITH WHAT IT PERCEIVES TO BE

"PROTECTIONIST" TENDENCIES ON THE PART OF ITS MAJOR TRADING PARTNERS AMONG THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. WE BELIEVE THE MOST EFFECTIVE METHOD FOR ATTEMPTING TO GARNER BRAZILIAN SUPPORT ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES TO BE FULL AND TIMELY CONSULTATIONS IN THE SPIRIT OF THE "NEW DIALOGUE." WE ALSO BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT BRAZILIAN SUPPORT WILL BE AT BEST LIMITED, PARTICULARLY ON ECONOMIC ISSUES, AND THAT IN A SHOWDOWN VOTE WHICH HAS HEAVY NACG/GROUP OF 77 SUPPORT BRAZIL WILL VOTE WITH THEM. END SUMMARY.

1. CERTAIN ASPECTS OF BRAZIL'S SITUATION SUGGEST IT COULD BE HELPFUL IN THE MULTILATERAL CONTEXT: A DEVELOPING COUNTRY (AND MEMBER OF THE GROUP OF 77). IT IS NEVERTHELESS INCREASINGLY CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT ITS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IS BRINGING IT TO SHARE MANY OF THE INTERESTS OF THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES; ITS HEAVY DEPENDENCE ON PETROLEUM IMPORTS (80 PERCENT OF NEED) MEANS THAT IT IS FULLY AWARE OF THE DIVERGENCE OF SOME INTERESTS AMONG THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES; IT WANTS TO FULFILL WHAT IT SEES AS ITS POTENTIAL FOR GREATER PARTICIPATION AND INFLUENCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS; AND, BASICALLY FRIENDLY TO THE U.S., BRAZIL SHARES OUR POINTS OF VIEW ON MANY ISSUES PURSUED BY THE NACG.

2. DESPITE ITS MOVEMENT TOWARD DEVELOPED STATUS, HOWEVER, BRAZIL CONSIDERS ITSELF TO BE A LDC WITH A FULL RANGE OF LDC ASPIRATIONS, COMPLAINTS AND PROBLEMS WITH THE DC'S. MOREOVER, BRAZIL HAS AND WISHES TO PROTECT A CERTAIN POSITION OF LEADERSHIP AND CREDIBILITY OR INFLUENCE IN LDC COUNCILS. IN ADDITION, ITS DEPENDENCE ON PETROLEUM IMPORTS HAS ONLY CONFIRMED ITS ESSENTIAL POSITION IN THE LDC CAMP SINCE IT DOES NOT WISH TO ALIENATE THE OIL-PRODUCING MEMBERS OF THE LDC COMPLEX. AS POINTED OUT IN REFTEL B PRIOR TO THE UNGA SPECIAL SESSION, THE PERCEIVED NEED TO AVOID OFFENDING THE SOURCES OF PETROLEUM (AND THEIR BLACK AFRICAN FRIENDS) HAS LED THE GOB TO MODIFY OPENLY ITS PREVIOUS STANCE OF EQUIDISTANCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST, TO MOVE PERCEPTIBLY AWAY FROM PORTUGAL REGARDING THE LATTER'S AFRICAN TERRITORIES, AND TO BEAT A SUBSTANTIAL RETREAT FROM ITS PREVIOUSLY PROMINENT AND STRONG STANCE REGARDING INTERNATIONAL MEASURES AGAINST

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TERRORISM AND HIJACKING.

3. PROTECTION OF ACCESS TO PETROLEUM SUPPLIES IS, HOWEVER, AN INTEREST THAT BRAZIL SHARES WITH MANY LDC'S AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ALIKE. WHERE BRAZIL IS PURSUING OBJECTIVES OF COMMON CONCERN TO MANY LDCS IS IN THE FIELDS OF TRADE, TECHNOLOGY, AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT. OBTAINING ACCESS TO DEVELOPED COUNTRY MARKETS FOR MANUFACTURES AND FAVORABLE PRICES FOR BASIC

COMMODITIES, AND ASSURING A CONSTANT INFLOW OF TECHNOLOGY AND INVESTMENT CAPITAL ON SUITABLE TERMS ARE IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES FOR BRAZIL AND OTHER LDCS. IN PURSUING THESE OBJECTIVES TO DATE, BRAZIL ADOPTED A PRAGMATIC AND LARGELY PARTICULARISTIC APPROACH, ACCOMPANIED BY AN UNWILLINGNESS TO BE CLOSELY TIED TO STRATEGY FORMULATED BY THE MULTI-FACETED INTERESTS OF THE GROUP OF 77.

4. UNTIL LATE 1973 BRAZIL FOUND LITTLE CAUSE FOR A SERIOUS QUESTIONING OF THE RATIONALE OF ITS FOREIGN TRADE POLICY. THE BREAKDOWN IN INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS AND DISCRIMINATION OF THE EEC AGAINST IMPORTS OF MANUFACTURES WERE AMPLY OFFSET BY THE WORLD COMMODITY BOOM AND THE GROWING SUCCESS OF EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES TO THE U.S. AND THE LAFTA MARKET. AT THE SAME TIME, THE TERMS OF TRADE HAD BECOME INCREASINGLY FAVORABLE AS PRICES FOR NEEDED IMPORTS OF HEAVY CAPITAL GOODS LAGGED BEHIND COMMODITY EXPORT PRICES; AND THE FULL IMPACT OF AN INCREASED OIL IMPORT BILL WAS NOT YET REALIZED.

5. THE BRAZILIANS' OWN JUDGMENT OF THEMSELVES AS A LDC AND THE NEED TO CONVOKE THE LDC BLOC TO ADVANCE THEIR OWN CAUSES AGAINST PROTECTIONISM IN THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES HAS FORCED BRAZIL BY MID-1974 TO RE-EXAMINE SERIOUSLY THE BASIC TENETS OF ITS FOREIGN TRADE POLICY. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION HAS CONTINUED TO LAG BEHIND INTERNAL DEMAND, REDUCING EXPORT AVAILABILITIES IN MOST AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES, AND THE TERMS OF TRADE HAVE DETERIORATED WITH THE SHARP INCREASES IN COSTS OF IMPORTED MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT. THESE DEVELOPMENTS PRODUCED A MUCH HIGHER THAN EXPECTED IMPORT BILL FOR CAPITAL GOODS AND WILL LIKELY LEAD TO AN UNPRECEDENTED TRADE DEFICIT OF SOME \$3 BILLION IN 1974 (PERHAPS \$1 BILLION WITH THE U.S.). UNDER THESE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES, THE ISSUES OF COUNTERVAILING DUTIES BY THE U.S. AND DISCRIMINATION BY THE ENLARGED EEC AGAINST MANUFACTURERS FROM NON-ASSOCIATE COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN ELEVATED IN IMPORTANCE

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FROM MERE VEXATIONS TO SERIOUS THREATS TO BRAZIL'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. WHILE NOT WISHING TO DO ANYTHING THAT WILL SHAKE FOREIGN INVESTOR CONFIDENCE, AS THE INFLOW OF INVESTMENT CAPITAL IS NEEDED MORE THAN EVER TO BALANCE OFF THE CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT, BRAZIL IS FEELING INCREASINGLY FRUSTRATED AND ISOLATED.

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IN CASTING ABOUT FOR ALLIES, BRAZIL IS GIVING A FRESH LOOK AT THE VIABILITY OF PRODUCERS' ALIANCES FOR COFFEE, COCOA, IRON ORE OR OTHER BASIC COMMODITIES WHICH THE COUNTRY PRODUCES IN ABUNDANCE; AND, AT THE SAME TIME, MIGHT GIVE GREATER ATTENTION TO THE POSSIBLE BENEFITS TO BE GAINED FROM ACTING IN CLOSER CONCERT WITH HER LAFTA PARTNERS AND THE GROUP OF 77. THE U.S. MIGHT WELL BECOME A PRIME TARGET FOR SUCH CONCERNED ACTION IN VIEW OF THE COUNTERVAILING DUTIES ISSUE AND BRAZIL'S HUGE TRADE DEFICIT WITH THE U.S.

6. THE COUP IN PORTUGAL HAS LED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANOTHER FACTOR IN BRAZIL'S BEHAVIOR IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS. WHILE THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT WAS GENERALLY WELCOMED IN BRAZIL, ONE FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL POINTED OUT THAT IT HAD "STOLEN OUR THUNDER"-- THAT IS, THAT IT CONFIDENTIAL

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RATHER VITIATED THE CREDIT THE GOB WASHOPING TO GET FOR ABANDONING, IF ONLY PARTIALLY, ITS MOTHER COUNTRY. DIS-APPOINTED IN THIS RESPECT BUT RELIEVED BY THE REMOVAL OF THE BURDEN IN ANY CASE, THE GOB SEEMS DETERMINED NOT TO

REPLACE THE PORTUGUESE ALBATROSS WITH ANOTHER. THIS POINT WAS SPECIFICALLY CITED TO US IN CONNECTION WITH THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE, TO WHOSE GOVERNMENT THE GOB IS HIGHLY SYMPATHETIC. THE GOB WAS DECLAREDLY AVERSE TO THE IDEA, AS ONE OFFICIAL PUT IT, OF "JOINING THE U.S. AS CHILE'S ONLY INTERANATIONAL DEFENDERS."

7. THUS THE GOB IS ACUTELY AWARE OF WHAT ONE FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL CALLED " THE POLITICAL AND PARLIAMENTARY REALITIES" OF THE UN--THE EXISTENCE OF AN "AUTOMATIC MAJORITY" WITH STEAMROLLER TENDANCIES. THE MINISTRY'S COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS ON THIS POINT WAS RAISED DRAMATICALLY WHEN--AND THIS INCIDENT HAS BEEN CITED TO US SPEARATELY BY SEVERAL OFFICIALS--THE NACG "AUTOMATIC MAJORITY"AT THE UNGA SIDED WITH ARGENTINA AGAINST BRAZIL ON THE ISSUE OF PRIOR CONSULTATION ON THE USE OF SHARED WATERWAYS.

8. THE GOB IS EXTREMELY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE SITUATION (ONE OFFICIAL SAID HE FELT BRAZIL WAS MORE VICTIMIZED BY IT THAT MOST). IN THE CONSULTATIONS WE CARRIED OUT ON STEAMROLLER TACTICS IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATE 104050, WE FOUND NOTHING BUT AGREEMENT, SYMPATHY, AND SHARED CONCERN. ONE OFFICIAL, NOTING THAT "PARLIAMENTARY DECORUM" IN THE UN HAD BEEN DECLINING FOR SOME TIME, OFFERED AS ONE SUGGESTION THEIDEA--WHICH HE RECOGNIZED AS VAGUE AND PERHAPS HOPELESS--OF SOMEHOW BOLSTERING THE GROUP OF 77, THUS WEAKENING THE NCAG BY COMPARISON.

9. ON SECURITY ISSUES PARTICULARLY, BRAZIL WIL BE LESS ATUOMATIC IN ITS IDENTIFICATION WITH THE LDC'S. THEY WILL LOOK AT SECURITY ISSUES THAT AFFECT OUR INTERESTS MORE CAREFULLY AND MAY BE PREPARED TO TAKE A MORE VISABLE POSITION OF OPPOSITION IN INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL, AT LEAST IN PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE. HERE, TOO, WE BELIEVE BRAZIL WILL FIND IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO RESIST BLOC PRESSURE IF IT FINDS ITSELF ISOLATED WITH THE U.S. AND A HANDFUL
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OF OTHERNATIONS. STIFFENING OF BRAZILIAN RESOLVE IN THESE SITUATIONS WILL NO DOUBT BE HELPED BY THE SECRETARY'S INITIATIVE IN FOSTERING AN IMPROVED RELTIONSHIP WITH LATIN AMERICA. THE "NEW DIALOGUE" HAS BEEN WELL RECEIVED HERE AS AN EARNEST OF U.S. GOOD FAITH, BUT THERE IS ALSO A VERY LARGE ELEMENT OF WAIT AND SEE WITH REGARD TO CONCRETE RESULTS DERIVING FROM THE DIALGOUE. THE COUNTERVAILING DUTY ISSUES WIL HAVE AN IMMEDIATE INFLUENCE ON BRAZILIAN ATTITUDES, WITH LONG-TERM ATTITUDES BEING DETERMINED BY FUTURE U.S. ACTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE AGENDA OF THE DIALOGUE.

10. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL, AND IN A SENSE WOULD REPRESENT FOLLOWING THROUGH ON THE SECRETARY'S INITIATIVE, IF FULLER AND MORE TIMELY CONSULTATIONS ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES WERE CARRIED OUT. THE MINISTRY HAS GENERALLY BEEN UNDERSTANDING AND RECEPTIVE WHEN URGENTLY ASKED FOR LAT-MINUTE SUPPORT, BUT BROADENING AND DEEPENING THE EFFORT WOULD SEEM CERTAIN TO IMPROVE THE PROCESS.

11. IN THE ABSTRACT, THE RESURRECTION OF A FUNCTIONING LATIN AMERICAN (OR SOME SORT OF REGIONAL) BLOC IN INTERNATIONAL FORUMS MIGHT BE USEFUL TO THE EXTENT THAT IT COULD PROVIDE BRAZIL (AND PRESUMABLY SOME OTHERS) WITH AN EXCUSE--THE NECESSITY OF REGIONAL SOLIDARITY--WITH WHICH TO DEFEND A VOTE OR POSITION OPPOSED BY THE SOURCES OF PETROLEUM AND THEIR ALLIES. WE CONSIDER, HOWEVER, THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE FORMATION OF ANY SUCH BLOC THAT WOULD BE EXPECTED TO VOTE AS WE LIKE A MAJORITY OF THE TIME ARE NOT BRIGHT.

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12. IN FACT, GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE ATTRIBUTED HERE TO PETROLEUM SUPPLY (ONE HIGH OFFICIAL DECLARED: "WITHOUT PETROLEUM, BRAZIL STOPS"), WE BELIEVE THAT ONLY ON AN ISSUE OF COMPARABLE--AND DIRECT--INTEREST TO BRAZIL WILL THE GOB BE WILLING TO RISK THAT SUPPLY. THIS SUGGESTS THE DESIRABILITY OF ATTEMPTING ON ANY GIVEN ISSUE TO IDENTIFY A POSSIBLE DIRECT INTEREST OF BRAZIL (AND BY EXTENSION OTHER COUNTRIES) AFFECTED BY THE ISSUE. WE HAVE NOTED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IN OUR CONSULTATIONS ON PRG, GRUNK, AND LIBERATION MOVEMENT ISSUES, MINISTRY OFFICIALS HAVE SHOWN LESS INTEREST IN CONSIDERATIONS OF CONFERENCE EFFICIENCY, UN RESPECTABILITY, AND PRESERVATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THAN THEY HAVE IN AVOIDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PRECEDENTS THAT COULD BE USED AGAINST BRAZIL OR ONE OF ITS CURRENTLY CONFIDENTIAL

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AMENABLE NEIGHBORS.

13. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT A SYSTEM OF BILATERAL REWARDS OR PUNISHMENTS FOR VOTES IN MULTILATERAL FORUMS--EVEN IF SUCH A SYSTEM COULD BE CONSTRUCTED, AND IN THE CASE OF BRAZIL IT IS DIFFICULT TO CONCEIVE OF SUCH A SYSTEM THAT WOULD NOT BE AT LEAST AS COSTLY TO US AS TO THE BRAZILIANS-- WOULD BE ANYTHING BUT COUNTERPRODUCTIVE IN THE CASE OF BRAZIL AND, FOR THAT MATTER, AT LEAST MOST OTHER LA COUNTRIES. THERE IS GENERAL SENSITIVITY IN THE AREA TO APPEARING TO BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO U.S. "PRESSURE," AND BRAZIL IS PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TO RECURRING CHARGES THAT IT IS THE SURROGATE OF U.S. "IMPERIALISM" IN THE REGION. INTIMATIONS OF POSSIBLE PUNISHMENT WOULD BE REJECTED AS THREATS, AND IF, AS IS LIKELY, THEY SURFACED, WOULD IMPEL A VOTE AGAINST US AS A DEMONSTRATION OF INDEPENDENCE. THE APPLICATION OF PUNISHMENT AGAINST A COUNTRY BECAUSE OF A VOTE WHICH, LET US SAY, IT HAD FELT OBLIGED TO MAKE IN ORDER TO PROTECT ITS SUPPLY OF A VITAL RAW MATERIAL, WOULD APPEAR CERTAIN TO SET OFF A ROUND OF REPRISALS AND COUNTER REPRISALS THAT WOULD SERIOUSLY HARM BILATERAL RELATIONS WITHOUT ENHANCING OUR MULTILATERAL SUPPORT. ON THE OTHER HAND, LIMITING OUR REACTION TO THE SPECIFIC AREA, I.E., PROVIDING EFFECTIVE SUPPORT TO POSITIVE PROGRAMS AND DENYING IT TO THOSE PRODUCED BY STEAMROLLERS, WOULD APPEAR MORE APPROPRIATE AND POTENTIALLY EFFECTIVE, AND WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD BY SOME, ALTHOUGH DOUBTLESSLY SHARPLY CRITICIZED BY OTHERS.

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